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BUILDING FINTECH ECOSYSTEMS: REGULATORY 
SANDBOXES, INNOVATION HUBS AND BEYOND 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Around the world, regulators and policymakers are working to support 
the development of financial technology (fintech) ecosystems. As one 
example, more than fifty jurisdictions have now established or announced 
dedicated testing environments called “financial regulatory sandboxes” 
that temporarily exempt fintech companies from certain licensing 
requirements. Others have announced or established “innovation hubs,” 
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sometimes incorporating a regulatory sandbox as one element. This article 
argues that innovation hubs provide all the benefits that the policy 
discussion associates with regulatory sandboxes, while avoiding most 
downsides of regulatory sandboxes, and that many benefits typically 
attributed to sandboxes are the result of inconsistent terminology, and 
actually accrue from the work of innovation hubs. The paper presents, as 
the first contribution of its kind, data on regulatory sandboxes and 
innovation hubs and argues that the data so far available on sandboxes does 
not justify the statement that regulatory sandboxes are the most effective 
approach to building fintech ecosystems. Regulatory sandboxes require 
significant financial contributions, sometimes new legislation, and intense 
regulatory risk management. They do not work as well on a stand-alone 
basis (i.e. without an innovation hub) either, while innovation hubs alone 
can provide more significant benefits in supporting the development of a 
fintech ecosystem. Consequently, regulators should rather focus their 
resources on developing effective innovation hubs, including, in 
appropriate cases, a sandbox as one possible element. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
How can policymakers best support the development of an innovative 
financial technology (fintech) ecosystem? Since 2016, an increasing 
number of financial regulatory and supervisory authorities have announced 
the establishment of “regulatory sandboxes” in order to encourage the 
development of their fintech ecosystems: According to the ADA Chair 
Sandbox database, the number of first-time financial regulatory sandbox 
announcements has climbed from only four in 2016 to thirteen in 2017 and 
twenty-three in 2018.1 Regulatory sandboxes are safe spaces in which 
FinTech start-ups and other innovative enterprises can develop and test their 
innovations without being subject to the full extent of financial regulation.2 
Regulators typically seek to use a sandbox to bring more competition into 
 
 
1. See infra Appendix A. 
2. Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley, Douglas Arner & Janos Barberis, Regulating a Revolution: 
From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 64 (2017).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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their financial services sector through more diverse and affordable product 
offerings for consumers.3 
Sandboxes have proven very popular with financial regulators worldwide 
since the first was introduced in the United Kingdom by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2016. Regulators in other jurisdictions quickly 
followed, including Australia, Hong Kong, Abu Dhabi, Canada, Denmark, 
Malaysia and Singapore. Many others have now joined the club. In total, we 
have tracked more than fifty jurisdictions around the world that have 
introduced financial regulatory sandboxes.4  
Yet, for all the interest the FCA’s regulatory sandbox has generated, with 
less than 120 participants since its inception,5 the sandbox has reached only 
a truly tiny portion of the total number of financial services firms in the 
United Kingdom and significantly fewer firms than the FCA has assisted 
through its innovation hub.6 More importantly, a significant share of young 
firms previously in the regulatory sandbox are now either insolvent or in 
liquidation.7 In other jurisdictions, like Australia, sandboxes have proven 
 
 
3. Id. at 68.  
4. We list regulatory sandboxes in the Appendix A only where we could verify the regulatory 
sandbox based on primary sources of law (i.e., legislation or financial regulation) accessible to us. Based 
on press releases, we estimate that at least another fifteen regulatory sandboxes exist or are about to be 
set up at the time of writing. See infra Appendix A.  
5. According to the ADA Chair Sandbox database, since the first cohort of the FCA sandbox 
started, 117 firms have received sandbox treatment in the five cohorts of the FCA’s sandbox so far. 
Compare this with the more than 60,000 licensed United Kingdom financial institutions. For an overview 
of sandboxed companies in the UK, see Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (last updated Dec. 
10, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/FKZ5-UK7T]. 
6. According to the FCA, it received more than five hundred requests for support over the 
eighteen-month period from the sandbox’s creation to April 2018. See Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin 
& Ian Ramsay, Fintech Sandboxes: Achieving a Balance Between Regulation and Innovation, 28 J. 
BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 314, n. 25 (2017). 
7. According to the ADA Chair Sandbox database (excluding firms of the fifth cohort), 
seventeen of the sixty-three sandboxed firms incorporated between 2015 to 2018 that belonged to one 
of the first four cohorts (i.e., twenty-seven percent) are not operational (“not operational” includes firms 
under insolvency proceedings, dissolved firms, dormant firms, as well as firms whose websites and/or 
social media presences are not operated anymore), while a further four percent were acquired. We can 
only speculate about the operations of firms participating in the 5th cohort. See also FIN. CONDUCT 
AUTH., THE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INNOVATE 5 (2019), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/the-impact-and-effectiveness-of-innovate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W4ZQ-QCYG] (stating that approximately “80% of firms that successfully tested in 
the Sandbox are still operational,” but including many well-established firms such as HSBC and 
Barclays).  
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unattractive for innovative firms.8 At the same time, some important 
financial systems—including most regulatory agencies in the United 
States,9 Germany, and Luxembourg—have refrained from introducing 
regulatory sandboxes. These experiences highlight the fact that a regulatory 
sandbox is only one of many ways a regulator can approach promoting and 
supporting a fintech ecosystem. Other approaches can include a range of 
efforts, focusing on research and development, human capital development, 
marketing, establishment of regulatory contact points, various forms of 
investment promotion including establishment of investment funds and 
matching schemes, creation of incubators and accelerators, and legal and 
regulatory reform. Together, these approaches make up the central elements 
of a supportive fintech ecosystem.  
In addition to regulatory sandboxes, an increasing number of jurisdictions 
are developing “innovation hubs” in order to support the development of 
their fintech ecosystems. This article compares sandboxes with innovation 
hubs, arguing that in many cases innovation hubs are likely to be more 
effective in building a fintech ecosystem.10 
A financial regulatory sandbox is most commonly a tightly defined safe 
space which automatically grants relief from certain regulatory 
requirements for those entities that meet the entry tests.11 An innovation 
hub, in contrast, is simply a portal, a means by which industry can readily 
access regulators to discuss their proposed fintech innovations, gain some 
guidance on navigating regulatory requirements, and potentially seek 
dispensations or adjustments in the specific regulations to which they will 
 
 
8. The ADA Chair Sandbox database lists seven firms that receive or have received sandbox 
treatment in Australia. The firms benefitting from sandbox treatment are disclosed at Regulatory 
Sandbox: License Exemption Users, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, https://asic.gov.au/for-
business/innovation-hub/fintech-regulatory-sandbox/regulatory-sandbox-licence-exemption-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/PQ5A-4LQ2]. 
9. See infra Section II.A. 
10. For a definition of innovation hubs, see EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES, FINTECH: 
REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND INNOVATION HUBS 7 (2018), 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory_sandbo
xes_and_innovation_hubs.pdf [https://perma.cc/34US-99HP] (defining an innvoation hub as “a scheme 
whereby regulated or unregulated entities can engage with competent authorities on FinTech-related 
issues and seek non-binding guidance on the conformity of innovative financial products, services, 
business models or delivery mechanisms with licensing, registration and/or regulatory requirements”); 
see also Zetzsche et al., supra note 2, at 38-39. 
11. See id. at 45. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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be subject.12 While sandboxes tend to attract the headlines and attention, the 
real work of promoting and facilitating innovation in financial services 
tends to be done, in virtually all jurisdictions where it does occur, by some 
form of innovation hub.  
Yet, of course, regulatory resources are always tightly constrained, which 
is especially true for most emerging and developing countries seeking to 
bolster innovation. Thus, it is the promise of facilitating real innovation in 
financial services without imposing real demands on these resources which 
accounts for sandboxes’ remarkable global popularity with financial 
regulators. This is entirely understandable. However, we bear bad news: 
regulators who genuinely wish to promote innovation need to make the staff 
available to interact with industry, assist with advice and guidance to fintech 
startups seeking to navigate the regulatory maze, and, where necessary, 
issue bespoke waivers or other forms of dispensation of some regulatory 
requirements.  
The numbers of entities in sandboxes are so limited because if the access 
regime is sufficiently broad to enable the participation of a wide array and 
number of participants, the likely result will be haphazard consumer 
protection. For this reason, sandbox entry conditions tend to be tight.13 
Genuinely innovative regulation can only occur, it seems, on a case-by-case 
basis (as most financial regulators around the world have done with no-
action letters, tailored dispensations and other such measures for many 
decades14). 
 
 
12. See COMMISSION DE SURVEILLANCE DU SECTEUR FINANCIER, ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2017) 
[hereinafter CSSF ANNUAL REPORT], 
https://www.cssf.lu/fileadmin/files/Publications/Rapports_annuels/Rapport_2017/RA_2017_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LN7-CDHC] (stating that an innovation hub includes a “constructive and open 
dialogue with the FinTech industry by making [CSSF staff] available for all entities wishing to present 
an innovative project. During these meetings, the CSSF provides the entities with advice and guidelines 
on the applicable regulatory framework in order to ensure that the project is developed in compliance 
with the regulations in force.”); JOINT ESA REPORT ON REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND INNOVATION 
HUBS, EUR. SUPERVISORY AUTHS. 5 (2018), 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory_sandbo
xes_and_innovation_hubs.pdf [https://perma.cc/55NV-6TE9] (defining an innovation hub as “a 
dedicated point of contact for firms to raise enquiries with competent authorities on FinTech-related 
issues and to seek non-binding guidance on the conformity of innovative financial products, financial 
services or business models with licensing or registration requirements and regulatory and supervisory 
expectations”). 
13. See infra Section I.A. 
14. See infra Sections III.C and III.D. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This is not to say regulatory sandboxes serve no purpose. For the 
relatively small number of entities that qualify, sandboxes do assist in the 
development process. And more importantly, because it is sandboxes that 
have been attracting the attention, having a sandbox sends a clear message 
to industry that a regulator is flexible and open to innovation in a way that 
having an innovation hub does not—in part because hubs are called 
different things in different places15—they lack the catchy descriptor that 
sandboxes carry. In our view, the most important function of any sandbox 
for a regulator is the strong message that having it sends to the market.  
The FCA sandbox grew out of its innovation hub, which is termed Project 
Innovate.16 Likewise, in Australia, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission’s (ASIC) sandbox grew out of its innovation hub, 
which long preceded the sandbox.17 However, many other jurisdictions 
attracted by the lower regulatory resources needed to operate a sandbox 
have implemented a sandbox without a broader hub.18 This strategy is 
unlikely to do much substantively to promote innovation, particularly in the 
large number of economies where there are limited numbers of financial and 
other startups: sandboxes tend to be most useful in those markets that 
already have a flourishing startup ecosystem but where those startups face 
regulatory challenges, barriers and uncertainties. In such cases a sandbox is 
very useful. In case where a jurisdiction is seeking to support the 
development of an innovation and startup ecosystem, innovation hubs are 
usually a better starting point. At the same time, pragmatically, if it is 
necessary to call what is in fact an innovation hub by the name of “financial 
regulatory sandbox” in order to build sufficient support then of course we 
are supportive of such strategies.  
This article begins by analyzing the typical entry conditions and elements 
of sandboxes in Part I. Part II outlines their potential benefits and, Part III 
considers some of their risks and ways to address them. Part IV concludes 
with a series of policy lessons to be drawn from this analysis for regulators 
 
 
15. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 2, at 39-43, for the diverging terminology.  
16. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 5, at 9 (timeline of Project Innovate). 
17. See AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, REPORT 523: ASIC ’S INNOVATION HUB AND OUR 
APPROACH TO REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY (2017), 
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4270022/rep523-published-26-may-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/95KR-3QF6]. 
18. For further detail, see the listings of narrow sandboxes infra, Appendix A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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seeking to support the development of innovation and innovation 
ecosystems in their own jurisdictions. Finally, Appendix A sets out a 
detailed descriptive table of proposed or implemented sandboxes, and seeks 
to characterize each as either narrow or broad. 
 
I. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SANDBOXES—ENTRY 
CONDITIONS AND ELEMENTS 
 
A. Entry Test 
 
Regulators around the world generally set up an entry test to determine 
whether a firm is qualified to “play in the sandbox.” This test typically has 
three general elements.  
First, the test will ask whether the intended product or service is 
appropriate for the sandbox. For example, proposed products or services 
often must: (i) support the financial services industry,19 (ii) provide genuine 
 
 
19. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX 7 (2015) [hereinafter FCA 
REGULATORY SANDBOX], https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7WHT-YJJ8]; BANK NEGARA MALAY., FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY REGULATORY 
SANDBOX FRAMEWORK 12 (2016) [hereinafter BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK], 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=57&pg=137&ac=533&bb=file [https://perma.cc/BHP2-
XEYZ]; see also AUTH. FOR THE FIN. MARKETS & DENEDERLANDSCHEBANK, MORE ROOM FOR 
INNOVATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR §§ 1.1, 1.3.i (2016) [hereinafter DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS], 
https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/onderwerpen/innovation-hub/publicaties/2016/room-for-
innovation-in-financial-sector.pdf ; BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT, FINTECH UPDATE: 
THAILAND’S FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX § A.3 (2016) [hereinafter BANK OF THAILAND 
SANDBOX], https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2016/10/fintech-
update/al_bangkok_fintechsandbox_oct16.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/5JLC-9TSE]; FIN. 
SUPERVISORY COMM’N, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY WORKS WITH THE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ON FINTECH 
UPGRADE (2016) [hereinafter FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM’N TAIWAN], 
https://www.feb.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=47&parentpath=0,7&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&d
ataserno=201610170001&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtab
le=Bulletin [https://perma.cc/4KCP-JWDU]. Bank Indonesia has not defined a rigid regulatory 
screening for  entrants to enter into the sandbox yet; however, it has a clear goal to support the financial 
services industry, as stated in BANK INDONESIA, OPTIMIZING POTENTIAL, STRENGHTENING 
RESILIENCE—ANNUAL REPORT 108–110 (2016), https://perma.cc/6XUY-GM69; see also Press 
Release, Gubernur BI Resmikan Bank Indonesia Fintech Office (Nov. 14, 2016) (available at 
https://perma.cc/ELR7-3A9F)(stating the four objectives of the FinTech office establishment); ABU 
DHABI GLOBAL MARKET, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 2 OF 2016 – POLICY CONSULTATION ON A 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT PARTICIPANTS DEPLOYING INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 13 (2016) [hereinafter ADGM GUIDANCE], 
http://adgm.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/a/d/ADGM_Consult_Paper_No_2_of_2016_
Washington University Open Scholarship
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innovation (i.e., new solutions to existing or new problems),20 and (iii) 
benefit consumers.21 The adequacy of the innovation requirement and its 
assessment by the competent authorities is debatable, given that it requires 
regulators to assess an innovation.22 This task is arguably beyond their skill 
 
 
Reg_Framewk_for_Fin_Tech_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR6W-27NL]; ECON. DEV. BD. MAURITIUS, 
REGULATORY SANDBOX LICENCE—GUIDELINES FOR FINTECH PROJECTS 5 (2018) [hereinafter 
MAURITIUS GUIDELINES], http://www.edbmauritius.org/media/1995/fintech-rsl-application-
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BFV-MRJH].  
20. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 19; FinTech & Innovation—Regulatory 
Sandbox Framework, CENT. BANK OF BAH. [hereinafter CBB Guidelines], 
https://www.cbb.gov.bh/fintech/ [https://perma.cc/6HX8-GBLL]; Fintech Regulatory Sandbox 
Guidelines, MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX GUIDELINES 5 (2016) 
[hereinafter MAS GUIDELINES], https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Smart-Financial-
Centre/Sandbox/FinTech-Regulatory-Sandbox-Guidelines-
19Feb2018.pdf?la=en&hash=1F4AA49087F9689249FB8816A11AEAA6CB3DE833 
[https://perma.cc/TPP5-ZK7D]; Fintech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines, AUTORITI MONETARI BRUNEI 
DARUSSALAM, FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX GUIDELINES § 4 (2017) [hereinafter AMBD 
GUIDELINES], https://www.ambd.gov.bn/SiteAssets/fintech-office/FTSG v1_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S77D-R2JA]; EIDGENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTEMENT EFD, ÄNDERUNG DES 
BANKENGESETZES UND DER BANKENVERORDNUNG (FINTECH): ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT ZUR 
VERNEHMLASSUNGSVORLAGE 33 (2017) [hereinafter EFD ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT], 
https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/47046.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TRD-JTBN]; 
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19, § 1.1; 
BANK OF THAILAND SANDBOX, supra note 19; Bank Indonesia Determines Fintech Operator in 
Regulatory Sandbox, BANK SENTRAL REPUBLIK INDON. (2018), https://www.bi.go.id/en/ruang-
media/info-terbaru/Pages/BI-Menetapkan-Penyelenggara-TekFin-dalam-Regulatory-Sanbox.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/CXF4-FMHA]; see Taiwanese FinTech Regulatory Sandbox to Launch in April, DIG. 
INNOVATION & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE CMTE. (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.digi.ey.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2CD8150D3764A46D&sms=9FA66FA17135C
FC2&s=036200688CAEE5CD [https://perma.cc/N66Z-5J9E]; ADGM GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 13; 
MAURITIUS GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 8. 
21. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 19; CBB Guidelines, supra note 20; MAS 
GUIDELINES, supra note 20,; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, §§ 4, 7.2(a)(iii); BANK OF THAILAND 
SANDBOX, supra note 19; OTORITAS JASA KEUANGAN (OJK), RUANG UJI COBA TERBATAS 
(REGULATORY SANDBOX) TEKNOLOGI FINANSIAL [SPACE FOR LIMITED TRIAL (REGULATORY SANDBOX) 
OF FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY] § 3(2)(d) (2017), https://www.bi.go.id/elicensing/helps/PADG 
REGSAND.pdf (requiring customer benefit); Press Release, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), OJK Drafts 
Regulations on Fintech Development (Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter OJK Press Release], 
https://www.ojk.go.id/en/berita-dan-kegiatan/siaran-pers/Pages/Press-Release-OJK-Drafts-
Regulations-on-Fintech-Development1.aspx [https://perma.cc/RH97-TUJB] (stating that regulations 
concerning the regulatory sandbox “specify the minimum requirements that need to be satisfied, so the 
industry’s development will be supported by the legal grounds essential for attracting investments and 
protecting consumer interests towards efficient and sustainable growth”); ADGM GUIDANCE, supra note 
19; MAURITIUS GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 8. 
22. See Bromberg et al., supra note 6, at 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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set, and one that the ASIC in Australia expressly chose not to undertake.23 
Sandbox rules will also often require regulators to assess whether the 
product or service enhances market stability, transparency and consumer 
protection, or otherwise serves the broader financial system.24 This is not a 
simple task for regulators.  
Second, regulators often are required to assess whether there is a need for 
the sandbox, or whether the technology, service, or activity is already 
appropriately covered by existing law and regulation.25  
Third, regulators require adequate preparation for participants to enter the 
sandbox,26 as they usually need to have entered the development stage (and 
have graduated from the project stage); understand laws and regulations 
governing their conduct; and engage in appropriate risk management. 
Other sandboxes—for instance that of the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA)27—are much less formal in entry requirements and 
 
 
23. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORY GUIDE 257—TESTING FINTECH PRODUCTS 
AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENCE, 15, (2017) [hereinafter ASIC RG 257], 
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4420907/rg257-published-23-august-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YM7E-HPEH].  
24. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 19, at 14,; MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, 
at 5-6; ADGM GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 6-7; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, §§ 3.3, 7.2(a)(ii), 
7.2(e), 8.4, 9.4(c), 10.3(a); ASIC RG 257, supra note 23; EFD ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT, supra note 20; 
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19, at 16; 
BANK OF THAILAND SANDBOX, supra note 19,; OTORITAS JASA KEUANGAN (OJK), supra note 21 (for 
an English summary of the requirements, see DELOITTE, NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (OJK) 
& BANKING REGULATIONS 4 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/id/Documents/audit/id-aud-ojk-banking-regulations-
dec2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TRG-TZ8T]); OJK Press Release, supra note 21 (stating that “[i]n terms 
of the scope of the Fintech draft regulations, the OJK is preparing rules about capital, business models, 
consumer protection and minimum risk management that Fintech companies should satisfy”); FIN. 
SUPERVISORY COMM’N R.O.C., supra note 19. 
25. See DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19; BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 19, at 6; FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 19, at 7; MAURITIUS GUIDELINES, supra note 
19, at 8. 
26. See BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19, at 6; MAS GUIDELINES, supra 
note 20, at 6; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 10; Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Exec., 
H.K. Monetary Auth., to All Authorized Insts. 2 (Sept. 6, 2016) [hereinafter HKMA FSS], 
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-
circular/2016/20160906e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANH5-5KZW]; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 
19, at 4; FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 19; MAURITIUS GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 8. 
27. For further detail on the sandbox’s procedures, see Fintech Supervisory Sandbox (FSS), H.K. 
MONETARY AUTH. (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-
financial-centre/fintech/fintech-supervisory-sandbox-fss/ [https://perma.cc/JR43-MJR7]. As to 
regulatory preconditions, see id. (“The HKMA has not laid down an exhaustive list of the supervisory 
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operations, illustrating that, despite commonalities, the differences between 
sandboxes in different markets can be very great indeed, to the extent that—
sometimes—what is labelled a sandbox may in fact operate more like an 
innovation hub. 
 
B. Scope 
 
The scope of coverage of individual sandboxes varies considerably. 
 
1. Sectoral Restrictions 
 
While Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Netherlands do 
not limit the sandbox’s scope to certain sectors,28 Switzerland and Hong 
Kong restrict their sandboxes to authorized financial institutions working 
with or without fintech firms.29 Arizona limits its scope to the three 
categories of money transmission, consumer lending, and investment 
advice, thereby excluding Insurance Technology (InsurTech) firms from 
participation.30 
Sectoral restrictions do little for fintechs and innovation, and should, if 
possible, be avoided. Such restrictions may only be appropriate for highly 
specialized sandboxes being operated to address shortcomings of the 
 
 
requirements that may potentially be relaxed within the FSS environment. Banks and their partnering 
tech firms intending to access the FSS are advised to get in touch with the HKMA early. The HKMA 
stands ready to discuss with them individually on the appropriate supervisory flexibility that can be made 
available within the FSS.”). 
28. Australian law instead limits the scope to testing of services providing financial product 
advice in relation to eligible products and dealing in eligible products. Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, 
ASIC Corporations (Concept Validation Licensing Exemption), Instrument 2016/1175 § 5(1)(a)–(b) 
(Dec. 15, 2018); see also MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 4; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 
5; BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19, at 2,; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 
19, at 7.  
29. The Swiss approach concerns deposits from the public (“Publikumseinlage”) which licensed 
banks tend to hold. See EFD ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT, supra note 20, at 2. The Hong Kong approach 
is available for authorized institutions which wish to try out new technologies (“banking services”). 
HKMA FSS, supra note 26, at 1. For the Thai approach and discussion of the Bank of Thailand Sandbox, 
see Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
Thailand Dinner Talk: The Thai Economy: The Current State and The Way Forward (Mar. 13, 2017), 6, 
https://www.bot.or.th/English/PressandSpeeches/Speeches/Gov/SpeechGov_13Mar2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9M33-DXMM]. 
30. Paul Watkins, Evan Daniels & Stuart Slayton, First in the Nation: Arizona’s Regulatory 
Sandbox, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2018). 
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regulatory framework with regards to certain innovations, like robo-
advice.31 Restrictions entrench existing regulatory borders. In many cases, 
for example in risk management, technology initially developed for banks 
(fintech) may be of more use for insurance (InsurTech). Hence, allowing 
expansion into InsurTech is crucial. Sectoral restrictions are also counter-
productive in that they reduce economies of scale and thus the value of an 
innovation.  
At the same time, while sectoral restrictions are undesirable, in some 
cases a regulator-sponsored sandbox is, of necessity, limited by the 
respective regulators’ scope of jurisdiction. For instance, in Hong Kong, the 
HKMA only has regulatory authority over banks and banking activities and 
its sandbox is therefore limited accordingly. The same applies to the 
sandboxes of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and Hong 
Kong Insurance Authority—both limited to participants within the sectoral 
regulatory jurisdiction of the respective regulator. In such cases, 
cooperation between the banking and market-conduct regulators may show 
the way forward. In the meantime such cooperation is established among 
Hong Kong regulators that provide for a “single point of entry, if needed, 
for pilot trials of cross-sector fintech products”32 (as in other similar cases, 
for instance the Netherlands). South Africa’s sandbox announced in 2019 
provides an example, where it expressly covers all sectors but can only do 
so by involving all the financial regulators (namely the Reserve Bank of 
South Africa, the Financial Services Conduct Authority, and the Treasury, 
together the newly established “Intergovernmental Fintech Working 
Group”).33  
 
 
 
 
31. See generally Wolf-Georg Ringe & Christopher Ruof, A Regulatory Sandbox for Robo 
Advice, EBI Working Paper (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188828 [https://perma.cc/6QTS-54V3]. 
32. See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 27. 
33. See Francois Groepe, Deputy Governor of the S. Afr. Reserve Bank, Opening Remarks at the 
Inaugural Intergovernmental Fintech Outrach Workshop: The Fintech Phenomenon: Five Emerging 
Habits That May Influence Effective Fintech Regulatio 4 (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/Speeches/Attachments/520/The fintech phenomenon five emerging 
habits that may influence fintech regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/97H3-RWYC]. 
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2. Regulated-Entity Restrictions 
 
Treatment of existing regulated entities varies. While some regulators do 
not allow elements of existing entities into the sandbox,34 others do: For 
instance, the HKMA only opens participation to authorized institutions 
(though potentially in conjunction with fintech firms35), whereas others 
(namely Brunei, the Netherlands and Mauritius36) only permit newer firms 
to enter, while existing authorized firms may benefit from no-action letters 
(which are not standard practice in some other countries, notably the United 
Kingdom37), informal individual guidance on how to read the law, and 
waivers from certain mandatory requirements.  
 
3. Limits in Targeting Customers 
 
There are often limits with regard to the customers the sandbox 
participant is allowed to target. With the exception of the Australian class 
waivers, these limits vest discretion in regulators. For instance, the 
HKMA’s sandbox38 is open for services targeting “staff members or focus 
 
 
34. This is particularly true for the Australian, Bruneian, and Swiss sandbox approaches that 
open unregulated space for unregulated entities only. However, the long-standing Australian practice of 
no-action letters for licensed entities may have lessened the need for further leniency for these entities. 
35. See HKMA FSS, supra note 26, at 1. 
36. See DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19, at 8, 10-13 (stating that already-established firms 
have the possibility to apply for a “partial authorization” or an “authorization with requirements” instead 
of a sandbox license); ADGM GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 13-14; Mauritius Guidelines, supra note 19, 
at 5.  
37. See Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June 27, 2016), 
https://wiki.harvard.edu/confluence/download/attachments/204380235/FCA%20Regulatory%20Sandb
ox%20Announcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JSS-FNYE] (“This [no-action] letter would give firms 
some comfort that as long as they dealt with us openly, kept to the agreed testing parameters and treated 
customers fairly, we accept that unexpected issues may arise and we would not expect to take 
disciplinary action. We would only use this tool for cases where we are not able to issue individual 
guidance or waivers but we believe it is justified in light of the particular circumstances and 
characteristics of different sandbox tests. The letter would only apply for the duration of the sandbox 
test, only to our disciplinary action and will not seek to limit any liabilities to consumers. We have not 
used this tool before, so we do not have examples of particular circumstances where these letters may 
be appropriate.” (emphasis added)). 
38. See HKMA FSS, supra note 26, at 1. 
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groups of selected customers”,39 while the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS)40 allows the applicant to choose the type of customer. ASIC41 treats 
services offered to retail and wholesale clients as eligible, while Arizona42 
sets a hard cap of ten thousand Arizona customers. This is, however, only 
one side of the story, as all regulators retain the rights to impose additional 
restrictions. The more that retail clients comprise the focus of the fintech, 
the more restrictions regulators will typically impose. This aspect is 
emphasized by the United Kingdom FCA43 which requires that the “type of 
customers should be appropriate for the type of innovation and the intended 
market, but also to the type of risks they are exposed,” while Bank Negara 
Malaysia may restrict “the participation of customers to a certain segment 
or profile of customers.”44  
Proportionality should underlie the sandbox approach. If wholesale 
clients are sufficiently sophisticated and skilled to understand the risks they 
take,45 it may suffice if fintechs serving those clients are simply required to 
disclose their regulatory status. However, fintechs targeting retail clients 
should typically incur a higher degree of regulation.46  
The client type does not obviate systemic risk concerns, however, and we 
may expect those concerns to be aired more often when fintechs target large, 
typically wholesale, clients. For instance, a fintech delivering an entirely 
new risk calculation to most of the major banks in a market could well give 
rise to systemic concerns. 
 
 
39. See id. 
40. See MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 15; see also AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, §§ 
1.3, 10.3. 
41. See ASIC RG 257, supra note 23, at 22-23. 
42. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(2) (2018) (amended 2019) (up to ten thousand 
customers, who must be residents of Arizona). See section 41-5605(C)(1) for a possible extension to 
17,500 customers. 
43. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DEFAULT STANDARDS FOR SANDBOX TESTING PARAMETERS 
(2017) [hereinafter FCA DEFAULT STANDARDS], https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-
standards-for-sandbox-testing-parameters.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD7M-LJ3A]. 
44. See BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19, at 5.  
45. We take no position on the achievability of this proviso.  
46. This case is made by Australian consumer protection activists. See Year Long Holiday for 
Financial Firms Leaves Consumers at Risk, FIN. RIGHTS LEGAL CTR. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://financialrights.org.au/year-long-holiday-for-financial-firms-leaves-consumers-at-risk/ 
[https://perma.cc/TY2R-7F99]. 
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4. Time and Size 
 
The period a fintech is allowed to play in the sandbox is typically limited, 
either by a rule or on a case-by-case basis.47 Periods range, in the first 
instance, from six months (United Kingdom, Brunei-Darussalam, India, 
Mozambique48), to twelve months (Australia, Thailand, Malaysia49), to 
twenty-four months (Ontario, Abu Dhabi, Arizona50). Generally, extensions 
are available.  
The more certain the sandbox conditions, the more likely they will suffice 
as a risk mitigating device, thereby reducing the importance of the time 
limit. For instance, the Swiss sandbox proposal (“Innovationsraum”) is not 
limited timewise.51 Under this proposal, as long as the fintech remains 
below the determined threshold of one million Swiss francs (CHF) in 
deposits from the public, it will not be subject to a licensing requirement.52 
If the fintech has between one million Swiss francs and one hundred million 
Swiss francs in deposits from the public, it will be subject to a restricted 
license scheme with a lower regulatory burden.53 However, such limits may 
not suit specific risks and opportunities or neglect systemic implications. In 
some cases, regulators should consider other thresholds, depending on the 
business model, including the number and type of clients.  
 
 
 
47. See MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19, at 16. In 
addition, the HKMA seems to practice a case-by-case assessment. 
48. See FCA DEFAULT STANDARDS, supra note 43; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, 
Appendix B; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, DRAFT ENABLING FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY SANDBOX 5 
(2019), https://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=920 
[https://perma.cc/T4R5-SN7U]; Kátia Agostinho, How FSDMOC Is Addressing Financial Sector 
Regulation Challenges: The Regulatory Sandbox Story!, FIN. SECTOR DEEPENING MOZAM. (Sept. 17, 
2018), http://fsdmoc.com/fsdmoc-addressing-financial-sector-regulation-challenges-regulatory-
sandbox-story/ [https://perma.cc/94Y3-KKQQ]. 
49. See Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, supra note 28, § 6(2); ASIC RG 257, supra note 20, at 20; 
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19; BANK OF THAILAND SANDBOX, supra note 19, 
§ A.4. 
50. See In re AngelList Advisors LLC (Mar. 27, 2017) 40 OSCB 2807 (Can. Ont. Sec. Comm’n); 
ADGM GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 10; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(A) (2018). 
51.  EFD ERLÄUTERNDER BERICHT, supra note 20, at 18. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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B. Mandatory Provisions Subject to Waiver 
 
Most sandbox rules do not specify which mandatory provisions may be 
lifted,54 but some regulators do disclose the minimum level of compliance 
required inside the sandbox. For instance, Singapore’s MAS is flexible 
regarding licensing fees, an entity’s capital requirements, leadership 
requirements, credit rating, and relative size, and the organization of the 
entity relating to supervisory standards of financial soundness, risk 
management, and outsourcing. However, MAS rules are, appropriately in 
our view, strict on confidentiality of customer information, the fitness of 
management (in particular their honesty and integrity), handling of 
customers’ monies and assets by intermediaries, as well as anti-money 
laundering and countering terrorism financing (AML/CTF) measures.55  
The Ontario Securities Commission, upon conditions that certain 
investors access only certain services, has granted relief in respect to audit 
requirements regarding financial statements, know-your-client 
requirements, suitability requirements, dispute resolution requirements, 
certain disclosure and reporting requirements, and prospectus 
requirements.56 On the other hand, the HKMA requirements that may be 
waived in the sandbox are security-related requirements for electronic 
banking services and the timing of independent assessment prior to 
launching new technology services.57 Most authorities sensibly refrain from 
stipulating an exhaustive list of requirements that may potentially be relaxed 
within the regulatory sandbox, preferring to retain flexibility.  
 
C. Removing the Privilege 
 
Sandbox rules typically specify grounds upon which the regulators will 
withdraw the privilege.58 Reasons for dismissal from the sandbox include 
 
 
54. See BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19; FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX, 
supra note 19; HKMA FSS, supra note 26, at 2 (HKMA does not want to provide “an exhaustive list of 
the supervisory requirements that may potentially be relaxed”); BANK OF THAILAND SANDBOX, supra 
note 19, § A.1 (“somewhat lenient rules”).  
55.  See MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 10.  
56.  See AngelList Advisors, LLC (Mar. 27, 2017) 40 OSCB 2807 (Can. Ont. Sec. Comm’n). 
57.  HKMA FSS, supra note 26, at 2. 
58.  See ASIC RG 257, supra note 23, at 16; BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 19, at 9; MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 7; AMBD GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 6; ADGM 
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the risks of the venture exceeding the benefits, non-compliance with laws 
or regulatory impositions, and the purpose of being in the sandbox not being 
achieved.59  
The first reason reflects the objectives of the sandbox. The regulatory 
sandbox is made available because the regulator expects benefits to 
outweigh risks. Thus, the privilege should be removed as soon as it is 
established that the risks now outweigh the benefits. Regulatory risks may 
come from the fintech’s conduct, so non-compliance is a natural reason to 
reconsider regulatory leniency. Likewise, if the regulator believes that 
granting privileges has not furthered innovation, it should “pull the 
privilege”. And, finally, of course, firms should have the right to opt out, by 
either shutting down the business or moving into the regulated sphere. 
 
II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF SANDBOXES 
 
There are three principal potential market benefits of implementing a 
regulatory sandbox. The first is the message the establishment of a sandbox 
sends. The second is the boost to innovation. The third is how much the 
regulator stands to learn about innovations.  
Interestingly, while all the focus globally seems to have been on 
sandboxes, Australia’s experience clearly suggests that an innovation hub 
may well be a far more important regulatory reform and a far better way of 
achieving these three ends. However, it also remains true that terms like 
“Innovation Hub” or “Project Innovate” will not serve as effective 
messaging the way the image of toys in a sandpit does. Perhaps one day a 
psychologist will identify some failure of maturation in childhood 
development shared by many fintech entrepreneurs—but of course, not 
scholars, who are too grown-up for their own good. Or perhaps the term 
sandbox is simply fun, somewhat paradoxical, and memorable? Thus, if one 
has to call an innovation hub a sandbox in order to make it happen, we are 
not adverse. But it is important to make sure that it is the innovation hub 
elements which are included in order to maximize developmental benefits.  
 
 
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 12; DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19, part 3; CBB Guidelines, supra 
note 20. 
59.  See CBB Guidelines, supra note 20 (“a critical flaw (i.e. a flaw that causes the risk to 
customers or the financial system to outweigh any benefits of the service . . .) has been discovered”). 
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A. Market Message of Having a Sandbox 
 
A regulatory sandbox signals a regulator’s propensity to support 
innovation. In Australia, for example, ASIC allows the requirement of an 
Australian financial services license to be waived for entities admitted to its 
regulatory sandbox. However, this waiver is subject to restrictive conditions 
and eligibility criteria, which has resulted in very limited participation.60 In 
fact there are only about six entities that have taken advantage of ASIC’s 
sandbox. Comparison with the HKMA sandbox in Hong Kong suggests 
why this might be so, as this sandbox has no limit on the duration of the 
exemption period, no financial limits on the businesses that may apply, and 
a broader range of eligible products and services than does the ASIC one.61 
At the insistence of the Federal Treasury in Australia, there is a proposal to 
expand the breadth of ASIC’s sandbox, and the legislation to implement this 
is progressing slowly through federal Parliament.62 
Nonetheless—and this is perhaps the most important learning in the story 
of ASIC’s sandbox—its sandbox seems to have been a success, precisely 
because it has sent a message to the industry and the market that ASIC is a 
flexible, approachable regulator open to dealing with innovative enterprises.  
The number of entities in a regulator’s sandbox is typically very small. 
For instance, in the pioneering sandbox established by the United Kingdom 
FCA, there were eighteen participants in cohort one.63 At the time of 
writing, the ADA Chair Sandbox Database lists 117 firms for the United 
Kingdom and six firms for ASIC—truly a tiny proportion of financial 
services firms licensed in those countries.64 An outlier in this regard is the 
 
 
60.  Lance Sacks, Growing the Sandbox—Australia’s enhanced Fintech regulatory sandbox, 
CLIFFORD CHANCE (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2017/11/growing_the_sandboxaustraliasenhance.html 
[https://perma.cc/4QPF-ZCAB]. 
61.  See, e.g., id. at 6.  
62.  The Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Measures No 2) Act 2019 passed the House of 
Representatives in Australia on October 15, 2019. The bill is before the Senate at the time of this writing. 
63.  Regulatory Sandbox—Cohort 1, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 [https://perma.cc/8SWP-N7AB] (last 
updated June 15, 2017). 
64.  Sector Overview, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/about/sector-overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z5HV-L67M] (last updated Apr. 9, 2018) (“The FCA is the conduct regulator for 
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Regulatory Sandbox Register by the CBB in Bahrain, which lists thirty-one 
participants currently active inside the sandbox framework compared to 385 
fully regulated financial institutions;65 this indicates a broader sandbox 
definition than we have applied in this article, perhaps highlighting an 
innovation hub labelled as a sandbox.  
Our research suggests that sandboxes play two far more important roles 
than supervising the small number sandboxed entities, and both should 
appeal to developing countries’ regulators.66 First, establishing a sandbox 
sends a strong message to fintechs that the regulator is open to innovation.67 
The strength of the message, however, is highly time-specific and also—in 
our view—jurisdiction-specific. Any copy-cat sandbox project does not 
send as strong a pro-innovation signal as did the FCA’s original sandbox. 
This is even more true in a world where almost fifty sandboxes have been 
created or announced around the globe.68 Moreover, sandboxes are probably 
most effective in jurisdictions where there is already a significant number 
of innovation-focused firms (such as the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Australia, and Singapore), and less effective in developing countries that 
lack a significant number of startups and innovation companies. In many 
cases, such developing jurisdictions are unlikely to attract desirable foreign 
participants by way of a sandbox, nor is a sandbox is not really the best way 
to encourage the development of domestic firms.  
 
 
58,000 financial services firms and financial markets in the UK, and the prudential regulator for over 
18,000 of those firms.”). 
65.  See CBB Guidelines, supra note 20; Number of Banks and Financial Institutions—April 
2019, CENT. BANK OF BAHRAIN, https://www.cbb.gov.bh/ [https://perma.cc/9KR2-LFXM]. 
66.  See Zetzsche et al., supra note 2, at 101. 
67.  See Watkins et al., supra note 30, at 5 (discussing how the concentration of FinTech 
companies and a “benefit of live testing within a sandbox” may attract venture capital firms and give 
venture capital a reason to “leave its narrow ambit on the coasts to create a more diverse investment 
portfolio”); see also I. JENIK & K. LAUER, REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION 4 
(2017), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Working-Paper-Regulatory-Sandboxes-Oct-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2ZB-8YZ8]. However, this message may also be sent by innovation hubs. See 
UNSGSA FINTECH WORKING GROUP AND CCAF, EARLY LESSONS ON REGULATORY INNOVATIONS TO 
ENABLE INCLUSIVE FINTECH: INNOVATION OFFICES, REGULATORY SANDBOXES, AND REGTECH 25 
(2019), https://www.unsgsa.org/files/3515/5007/5518/UNSGSA_Report_2019_Final-compressed.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GH3M-DH5Z] (“A dedicated innovation office with knowledgeable staff and a strong 
will to push things through was identified as a key enabler of a pro-innovation culture.” (emphasis 
added)). 
68. See infra Appendix A. 
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Second, sandboxes provide an important learning opportunity for 
regulators, especially when coupled with an innovation hub. An innovation 
hub which integrates with a sandbox can change traditional dynamics, as 
the industry comes to see the regulator as an entity they can approach for 
assistance with regulatory challenges rather than a distant policeman to be 
avoided. ASIC, in a series of proactive moves, has managed to achieve this 
cultural shift with a combination of an innovation hub, a regulatory sandbox 
and its Digital Finance Advisory Panel, which meets quarterly and includes 
representatives from industry, industry associations, and all relevant 
regulatory agencies.69 The planned structure in South Africa is similar, with 
the sandbox explicitly envisaged as a way for the regulator to learn about 
innovations in technology and business models in order to best develop 
proportional regulatory responses.70  
The numbers really highlight the effectiveness of an innovation hub 
relative to a regulatory sandbox. In ASIC’s case, from March 2015 to 
December 2018, its innovation hub dealt with 380 entities, provided 
informal assistance and advice to 347 of those, and granted sixty-nine new 
credit licenses.71 Compare these figures with the six entities that, in a 
somewhat shorter period, took advantage of ASIC’s regulatory sandbox. 
The experience seems to be that very few potential entrants qualified for the 
relatively strict sandbox requirements, and that nearly every potential 
entrant required the more bespoke approach that the hub facilitates. 
Furthermore, while an innovation hub is admittedly far more demanding of 
seasoned regulatory expertise and more risky to regulatory reputation—due 
to the need to issue an immediate assessment—than a sandbox,72 this 
 
 
69. See Digital Finance Advisory Panel, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N (Jan. 5, 2019), 
https://asic.gov.au/for-business/innovation-hub/asic-and-fintech/digital-finance-advisory-panel/ 
[https://perma.cc/X9K7-EYCK]; ’15-21 MR Innovation Hub: ASIC Update, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. 
COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2015-
releases/15-211mr-innovation-hub-asic-update/ [https://perma.cc/8ZTG-7565]. Ross Buckley, one of 
the authors of this article, currently chairs the Digital Finance Advisory Panel of ASIC and the views 
herein are strictly his own, not ASIC’s.  
70. See Groepe, supra note 33, at 7. 
71. Progress Report, Mar. 2015-Dec. 2018, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N’S INNOVATION HUB, 
https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4956819/innovation-hub_progress-report-infographic_dec18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RP4R-YB9U] See supra note 5 for data regarding FCA’s Project Innovate. 
72. This is often overlooked in policy papers. See UNSGSA, supra note 67, at 25 (“An 
innovation office is only as useful as the quality of the regulatory resources behind it. Innovation offices 
are often able to start up quickly with a core staff of two or three, then expand based on need and demand. 
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demand on regulator time is also a major advantage of a hub, as it facilitates 
a more interactive two-way knowledge exchange. This is vital for regulators 
in this field, as it keeps them right at the cutting-edge of developments in 
technology. The previous literature has accredited those "bidirectional 
educational benefits" to sandboxes alone.73 In fact, innovation hubs are 
doing the same work, and we would suggest potentially much better. 
ASIC has long been a flexible regulator willing to work one-on-one with 
industry participants, so in one sense its innovation hub is merely a 
continuation and formalization of past practices. The important thing, from 
their perspective, however, is that their sandbox and hub, in a way, have 
served to announce to fintechs outside Australia, in particular, that ASIC is 
open for business. This experience confirms the findings in some of our 
earlier research that the major reasons for any regulator to have a sandbox 
are (a) to send a message to the market about the regulator’s flexibility and 
openness, and (b) for the regulator to learn about cutting edge developments 
from the industry in the dialogues that sending this message to the market 
tends to engender.74 If the pro-innovation message is the sandbox’s principal 
objective, there should be little reason to create one in financial centers 
known for their openness to innovation. This is particularly true if the pro-
innovation message had already been sent without a sandbox, as 
Luxembourg, for example, has done by introducing the world’s first 
innovation hub.75  
 
 
(By contrast, the design stage alone of a regulatory sandbox requires significantly more staff and even 
further resources in its implementation stage.) Innovation offices in both the UK and the U.S. have 
commenced with a lean approach and expanded as necessary.”). 
73. See Michael Wechsler, Leon Perlman & Nora Gurung, The State of Regulatory Sandboxes 
in Developing Countries 25 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285938 [https://perma.cc/9VKR-2HL5]; 
see also Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L. J. 235, 291 
(2019). 
74. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 2, at 101. 
75. Luxembourg’s CSSF had created the first innovation department in 2014, sending a pro-
innovation message without a sandbox. As a result of the innovation department, the CSSF has issued 
licenses to companies like Bitstamp Europe, BitFlyer Europe, Finologee, PPRO and SnapSwap 
International, turning Luxembourg into a cryptocurrency and payments center. Since 2018, the 
Luxembourg House of Financial Technology (LHoFT), a public-private partnership, has provided the 
functions of an innovation hub in cooperation with the CSSF. The non-exhaustive list on LHoFT’s 
website details approximately one hundred firms, including Ripple and LendInvest. See Our Innovators, 
THE LHOFT, https://www.lhoft.com/en/our-startups [https://perma.cc/CG2S-ZPHS] See also Zetzsche 
et al., supra note 2, at 40. 
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The United States landscape is different, and currently does not have an 
active federal regulatory sandbox.76 In part, this is because of the view that, 
whilst the promotion of innovation matters, doing so may not be the proper 
role of the regulatory authority.77 There is also a view that many of the 
federal securities laws are not amenable to being waived.78 However, some 
efforts have gone into promoting innovation on a federal level, including 
the creation of innovation hubs, proposing a federal sandbox through a body 
other than the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and 
sandboxes being implemented at the state level, with Arizona79 and now 
Wyoming80 leading in that sense. 
The SEC includes the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial 
Technology (FinHub). The FinHub seeks to facilitate the SEC’s “active 
engagement with innovators, developers and entrepreneurs” as the financial 
technology sector quickly evolves.81 The FinHub does not include a 
sandbox, with the SEC stating that its “role is not to hand out permission 
slips for innovation.”82 Rather, the FinHub seeks to promote innovation 
through activities such as providing advice on digital marketplace financing 
and automating investment advice.83  
However, the view of the SEC regarding sandboxes is not necessarily 
unanimous in the United States. The U.S. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) has an innovation department that has proposed the 
implementation of a “Product Sandbox” which would “give companies 
regulatory relief when testing new financial products and services” and 
 
 
76. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 623-24 (2019) 
(providing detailed information on the possible forms of relief under US law). 
77. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Beaches and Bitcoin: Remarks 
Before the Medici Conference (May 2, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-050218 
[https://perma.cc/95XT-E5XG]. 
78. For the latest development , see Brendan Pedersen, OCC Lacks Legal Power to Create 
Fintech Charter, Court Rules, AM. BANKER (Oct 21, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occ-lacks-legal-power-to-create-fintech-charter-court-rules 
[https://perma.cc/2QMP-PZYC]. 
79. See Watkins et al., supra note 30. 
80. See Financial Technology Sandbox Act, H.B. 0057, 65th Leg. (Wyo. 2019). 
81. FinHub, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/finhub [perma.cc/89UK-JR7W]. 
82. Peirce, supra note 77. 
83. FinHub, supra note 81. 
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would include the sharing of data with the CFPB.84 They have also proposed 
implementing or revising their no-action-letter policy, global financial 
innovation network, and “Trial Disclosure Sandbox.”85  
 
B. Boost to Innovation and Competition 
 
Sandboxes and innovation hubs are designed to promote innovation and 
competition.86 First, the hope is that they will incentivize financial services 
firms to accelerate their digital transformation. Second, at the global level, 
sandboxes have added to the competition among financial centers seeking 
to become the world’s preeminent fintech hub. The sandbox, as an 
institution, challenges reluctant regulators without sandboxes and pushes 
them to publish and possibly review their dispensation policies. 
The operation of both of these impacts can be seen with the “global 
sandbox” program established by the Global Financial Innovation Network 
(GFIN), an FCA-inspired coalition of regulators from around the world.87 
The program aims to ensure consistent treatment in sandboxes across 
jurisdictions, incentivizing digital transformation and reflecting the global 
operation of many financial services firms. The program also seeks to 
increase the appeal of the seventeen participating jurisdictions to incoming 
financial services firms with their broad network.88 
While sandbox conditions could lead to a race-to-the-bottom 
competition, on balance, the more likely outcomes from sandboxes at this 
stage will be beneficial, as most countries are in dire need of more 
competition within their financial services sector.89  
 
 
 
84. Innovation, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/innovation/ [perma.cc/MX6E-YBKL]. 
85. Id. 
86. See Wechsler et al., supra note 73, at 11-14, 24. 
87. GLOBAL FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, GFIN—ONE YEAR ON: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION NETWORK REFLECTS ON ITS FIRST YEAR 4 (2019) [hereinafter GFIN Report], 
http://dfsa.ae/Documents/Fintech/GFIN-One-year-on-FINAL-20190612.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4E2-
VWRD]. 
88. Id. at 5 (“providing innovative firms with the opportunity to interact and engage with a 
network of regulators simultaneously”). 
89. See, for the US, Nicola Cetorelli & Philip E Strahan, Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank 
Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets, 61 J. FIN. 437 (2006) (stating that more 
concentrated markets lead to greater difficulties in gaining access to credits). 
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C. Regulatory Learning 
 
In a regulatory sandbox, regulators learn from the fintech startups due to 
their freedom to operate and communicate openly. This allows 
entrepreneurs to freely discuss their concerns without fear of putting their 
license at risk, and allows regulators to learn before major risks materialize. 
In the context of the GFIN, this learning occurs on an international level, 
with the network functioning as a forum for collaborative knowledge-
sharing between firms and regulators.90 Within the sandbox, dispensation 
efficiency is not curtailed by regulators being criticized for being too 
lenient, even though it places upon them an anti-dispensation incentive. In 
particular, when the conditions of the sandbox are specified clearly, 
entrepreneurs are assisted in arguing for dispensations.  
On the other hand, an innovation hub does not deliver the same certainty 
as to regulatory lenience. So, entrepreneurs may be more reluctant to share 
all details of their business. However, seasoned regulators with a pro-
innovation reputation will share information in an innovation hub that 
immediately assists firms to draft an adequate business plan. This results in 
a fast track to market with a full license, something that regulatory 
sandboxes cannot promise. This fast track to market requires a quid pro quo 
as to the details of the technology employed. Hence, in practice, an 
innovation hub prompts mutual learning similar to a regulatory sandbox. 
 
III. RISKS OF SANDBOXES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
 
A. Maintaining a Level Playing Field 
 
In designing a regulatory sandbox, maintaining a level playing field 
between regulated and unregulated entities may matter because otherwise, 
in the longer term, banks, insurers, and asset managers may suffer from a 
shortage of human and financial capital and of innovation that is drawn off 
to fintech startups. However, limitations with regards to time and money 
imposed on most firms in sandboxes at least diminish that risk.91 Regulators 
must strike a balance between encouraging innovation and protecting 
 
 
90. GLOBAL FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, supra note 87, at 3. 
91. Bromberg et al., supra note 6, at 9. 
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clients92 and the financial system. Regulated financial institutions must be 
supported to innovate to put to use their advantageous data sets, expertise 
and experience. Existing institutions should enjoy the supervisory free space 
to support the development of innovative products and services that is 
extended to fintech startups.  
Accordingly, regulators are well-advised to pair a regulatory sandbox 
with an appropriate approach to testing, piloting, adequate dispensation, and 
no-action policies for established regulated institutions. Sandbox rules and 
other practices should enable licensed und unlicensed institutions to benefit 
equally if they seek to develop innovative products or services. 
Sandboxes are not necessarily appropriate in all circumstances. 
Sandboxes are but one way to enhance communication between regulators 
and innovative firms; other approaches include class waivers, piloting, and 
sandbox umbrellas.93 
 
B. Alternatives and Complementary Measures to a Sandbox 
 
The principal complement to a sandbox, and the one we recommend, is 
an innovation hub. It supports the message of regulatory openness and 
flexibility that the sandbox sends. It also achieves the second and third 
benefits of a sandbox—the boost to innovation and competition and to 
facilitate regulatory learning—better than any sandbox, and it offers a 
further benefit over any sandbox, because it will typically benefit a much 
wider array of fintech firms than will fall within the relatively strict limits 
of any sandbox. The reason a hub probably does not achieve the first benefit 
of sending a message as effectively to the market is the huge interest and 
hype around sandboxes at the moment. This is the principal reason for a 
regulator to have both a hub and a sandbox. The hub does the heavy lifting 
of promoting innovation and competition (and it is heavy lifting because it 
will consume substantial regulator time), while the sandbox does the 
advertising role of promoting the jurisdiction as being open and receptive to 
fintech business. Both roles matter. In Australia’s case, the innovation hub 
preceded the sandbox by over a year, and experience has shown it to be the 
 
 
92. See id. at 8. 
93. Zetzsche et al., supra note 2, at 81-82. See infra Section III.C (class waivers) and Section 
III.D (testing and piloting regimes). 
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more effective regulatory innovation.94 This likely also explains why some 
sandboxes seem to resemble innovation hubs more than they do sandboxes 
as described in this article. 
There are, however, two other principal alternatives to a sandbox: class 
waivers and a testing and piloting regime. For the sake of completeness, 
because significant jurisdictions adopt both alternatives, we analyze both 
below.  
 
C. Class Waivers for Fintech Testing 
 
Australia is unique in that its sandbox grants a class waiver for fintech 
testing if certain eligibility criteria are met.95 Class waivers are made by 
regulators to exempt tightly defined classes of people or products from the 
obligation of complying with regulatory requirements. ASIC ties its hands 
to a greater extent than other regulators by using more generalized 
exemptions, thereby providing a high degree of regulatory certainty. If 
certain conditions are met, a firm qualifies automatically for a waiver of 
specified regulatory requirements. These conditions are: The service or 
product may not be offered to more than one hundred retail clients (the 
number of wholesale clients is not restricted).96 The test is limited to a period 
of twelve months and a total customer exposure of five million Australian 
dollars (A$).97 Further, he testing firm must have adequate compensation 
arrangements for losses (e.g., professional indemnity insurance), have 
dispute resolution processes in place, and meet pre-determined disclosure 
and conduct requirements.98  
The testing environment is limited to the provision of financial advice 
and the dealing in or distribution of financial products99 and other regulated 
instruments.100 The Australian class waiver does not extend to issuance of a 
product developed by the fintech, the lending of money to consumers, or the 
 
 
94. See Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, supra note 28, § 6. 
95. See id. § 5; ASIC RG 257, supra note 23, at 14. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. As defined in Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) § 12BAA. 
100. See Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, supra note 28, § 5(1); National Consumer Credit Protection 
Act 2009 (Cth) §§ 7, 29. 
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operation of a managed investment scheme (including marketplace lending 
platforms).101 The class waiver also only extends to eligible products, which 
are defined to include: 
• Deposit products, with a maximum A$10,000 balance; 
• Payment products, if issued by banks and with a maximum 
A$10,000 balance; 
• General insurance, for personal property and home contents up to 
A$50,000 insured; 
• Liquid investments, for listed Australian securities or simple 
schemes up to A$10,000 exposure; and 
• Consumer credit contracts with certain features, and for between 
A$2,001 and A$25,000. 
While the class waiver provides notable certainty, the experimental space 
it creates is limited. Any successful fintech operation will outgrow these 
limits quite quickly, which raises the question of whether ASIC may grant 
an additional sandbox arrangement beyond these limits or grant a restricted 
license to class-waiver beneficiaries that exceeds the waiver limits 
following a case-by-case assessment. So as to retain the pro-competitive 
effects of the class-waiver, the possibility of combining several 
arrangements or licenses seems preferable, but the overall situation is 
presently uncertain. 
A closer look reveals how different the class waiver is from a normal 
regulatory sandbox. ASIC does not engage with innovative firms prior to 
granting the privilege—the waiver is granted as a matter of law, rather than 
upon application.102 Innovation is not a prerequisite, nor does a knowledge 
exchange necessarily take place between privileged firms and ASIC. In fact, 
the Australian class waiver is a traditional approach cloaked in fintech-
friendly terms. ASIC has done this, in part because of sensible doubts as to 
its expertise in assessing how innovative is a business model. Similar 
approaches are likely in other countries where regulators have similar 
concerns.103  
 
 
101. Cf. ASIC REG. GUIDE 257, supra note 23, at 17. 
102. For the underlying legal provisions, see id. at 1. 
103. Notably, the Swiss regulatory sandbox proposal exhibits characteristics similar to the 
Australian class waiver, exempting all banking business up to CHF 1 million in deposits, without 
requiring notice or application to Swiss regulator FINMA. See Press Release, The Federal Council, 
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ASIC also operates its innovation hub, which achieves the learning 
benefits derived by other regulators from operating sandboxes, and hosts 
regular events for the industry, at which ASIC learns of recent 
developments, and the industry in turn learns about ASIC’s current 
regulatory thinking.104  
 
D. A Testing and Piloting Regime 
 
The international popularity of sandboxes does not make them silver 
bullet solutions. Sandboxes are one form of “test and learn” methodology, 
with a variety of regulators using different forms of the “test and learn” 
approaches to innovation and new technologies. For example, the U.S. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and SEC, the German 
BaFin,105 the Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur 
Financier (CSSF),106 both French regulators Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel 
et de Résolution (ACPR)and Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF),107 
and the Philippines Central Bank, have expressly declined to create 
regulatory sandboxes. Instead, these regulators apply leniency to testing and 
piloting.108 Other regulators use extensive piloting programs to substitute 
 
 
Federal Council Wants to Reduce Barriers to Market Entry for Fintech Firms (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-64356.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y92V-UE3P]. 
104. See Innovation Hub, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, https://asic.gov.au/for-
business/innovation-hub/ [https://perma.cc/H7CQ-MGGL]. 
105. Huw Jones, EU Guidelines on Fintech to Include “Sandbox” Design Recommendations, 
REUTERS (Sept 6, 2018), https://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCAKCN1LM25V-OCATC 
[https://perma.cc/D3P3-SBP8] (BaFin president Felix Hufeld declined to give “little buckets and 
spades” to startups). 
106. See CSSF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 41. 
107. Therese Torris, French Finance Regulators Embrace Fintech, CROWDFUNDINSIDER (Feb. 1, 
2017), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/02/95508-french-finance-regulators-embrace-fintech/ 
[https://perma.cc/9M8X-NZWL ]. 
108. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 10 (Mar. 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/summary-explanatory-statement-fintech-charters.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF6T-L2TD]; 
BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT (BAFIN), ANNUAL REPORT 40-41 (2015), 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/dl_jb_2015_en.pdf?__blob=publicatio
nFile&v=2 [perma.cc/HN9S-KREA].  
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for a regulatory sandbox.109 The approach of the HKMA, although labelled 
a “sandbox” is probably closer to this approach than the sorts of sandboxes 
we have focused on above.  
An exemption for testing and piloting is particularly useful for authorized 
financial institutions. They can test new technology and business models 
without filing for regulatory approval. The point where testing and piloting 
ends and regular activity starts can be challenging to identify. One 
characteristic for determining the begin of regular activity, however, will be 
an intention to permanently remain active in the market.110 A test lacks this 
feature; it is a one-time event, and whether the process is continued depends 
on the outcome of the test, which is entirely open. A pilot is a test where the 
organizational and financial resources have been devoted to the continuance 
of business and only some data for the decision are missing, which the pilot 
is designed to provide.  
Where clients consent, the fintech could justify testing and piloting for 
some time. From a regulators point of view, for this reason, the clarity of a 
sandbox’s rules may well be attractive.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We began this article with a question: What is the most effective way to 
support the development of an innovative fintech ecosystem? We have 
argued in this article that much of what regulatory sandboxes promise is 
delivered by innovation hubs which are likewise being established by 
 
 
109. For instance, the Taiwanese Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) used to run a FinTech 
Pilot Program that features many characteristics of a regulatory sandbox. See Press Release, Fin. 
Supervisory Comm’n., 金融與科技攜手，Fintech升級 [jīn róng yǔ kē jì xī shǒu shēng jí] (Sept. 9, 
2016), 
http://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=2&parentpath=0&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=201
609090002&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News 
[perma.cc/2F9Q-Q4BV]. Now the country is implementing a regulatory sandbox through legislation. 
The FSC-proposed FinTech Innovation Experimentation Bill has been implemented since April 2018. 
See The Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act and three Act-
authorized regulations implemented on April 30, 2018, FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM’N (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=74&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&d
ataserno=201806120003&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtab
le=Bulletin [https://perma.cc/2HLQ-CY86].  
110. This requirement is the basis of various legal licensing tests, such as professionalism, 
commercial activity, pursuing an activity as a business, and so on. 
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regulators, in some cases simultaneously with the sandbox. If we define 
sandboxes narrowly, they are a set of entry requirements, compliance with 
which entitles fintechs to participate in a safe harbor freed of many 
regulatory requirements. Among the many advantages associated with 
sandboxes as so defined, only one—easier, cheaper and faster regulatory 
compliance through a tailored process of restricted authorization—is 
attributable to sandboxes.  
The many other potential advantages of sandboxes are delivered at least 
as well by innovation hubs. These advantages include:  
• the potential for the regulator to issue informal advice and 
directions regarding regulatory compliance;  
• guidance on how to interpret requirements for a firm’s specific test; 
• waiver or modification of any “unduly burdensome rule” for the 
purpose of the test; and 
• “no action” letters where individual guidance or waivers are not 
possible, which provide an indication that disciplinary action will 
not be pursued for a finite duration if certain conditions are met (but 
do not offer any protection against liabilities to consumers). 
At the same time, the data so far available does not justify the statement 
that regulatory sandboxes, on a stand-alone basis, are the most effective 
means to further fintech innovation. Given that regulatory sandboxes 
require significant financial contributions, and sometimes new legislation, 
we conclude that regulators should focus their resources on developing 
effective innovation hubs rather than sandboxes.111 In many cases, the 
maximum benefit would be achieved by integrating an innovation hub and 
a sandbox together as part of a strategy to support the evolution of an 
innovative fintech ecosystem. We see particular benefits for innovation 
hubs—perhaps combined with a sandbox—in jurisdictions where there are 
few startups and limited innovation, as in many developing countries. In 
markets where there are existing fintech and startup ecosystems, sandboxes 
 
 
111.   See Simone di Castri & Ariadne Plaitakis, Going Beyond Regulatory Sandboxes 
to Enable FinTech Innovation in Emerging Markets (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3059309 (“Financial authorities, especially those with limited resources 
[in terms of funds, staff, expertise, and/or tools], should be careful not to prioritize sandboxes over other, 
more fundamental, infrastructure-building initiatives in their quest to enable digital finance.” (emphasis 
added)); JENIK AND LAUER, supra note 67, at 8 (“[R]egulators may need to consider less costly 
alternatives.”). 
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as defined throughout this article can prove very useful—even without an 
innovation hub. 
The reason we draw this distinction between sandbox and innovation hub, 
therefore, is that we believe a narrowly conceived sandbox is particularly 
attractive to regulators because it promises to be pro-innovation without 
drawing unduly on regulatory resources. Conversely, setting up both a 
sandbox and an innovation hub demands commensurate regulatory 
resources and delivers pro-innovation benefits in line with this investment 
of resources. There is no such thing as a free lunch. A regulator cannot have 
its cake, without paying for it. Where resources are limited, regulators 
should focus their resources on developing innovation hubs in order to build 
fintech ecosystems, rather than sandboxes. And where a sandbox is 
developed, in order to gain the greatest benefits to ecosystem development, 
it should be integrated as part of an innovation hub.  
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APPENDIX A—SANDBOXES AROUND THE WORLD112 
 
For the purposes of Appendix A, a “narrow” sandbox is one that is strictly 
for the purpose of providing regulatory relief to accepted entities. Often, 
narrow sandboxes exist within the framework of an innovation hub or 
equivalent. Narrow sandboxes are the most common. A “broad” sandbox is 
one that provides some of the services more commonly provided by an 
innovation hub.  
 
Jurisdiction Start Narrow or Broad? Authority 
Abu Dhabi Sept. 2018 Broad; it offers relief 
from financial 
regulations, as well as 
fintech solutions and 
international market 
access113 
Abu Dhabi Global 
Market (ADGM), 
partnering with 
ASEAN Financial 
Innovation 
Network (AFIN) 
 
Australia Dec. 2016 Narrow; but it exists 
within the framework 
of the “innovation 
hub” 114 
Australian 
Securities and 
Investments 
Commission 
(ASIC) 
 
 
 
112. This section draws on the ADA Chair Sandbox Database. For China, Israel, Jamaica, 
Sweden, Turkey, and Uganda, sandboxes have been proposed or announced according to newspaper 
articles, but we could not verify the existence of a sandbox with official sources, so we have not included 
them here. 
113. See Press Release, Dubai International Fin. Centre, DFSA Regulatory Sandbox Accepts 
Seven New Firms into its Latest Cohort (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.difc.ae/newsroom/news/dfsa-
regulatory-sandbox-accepts-seven-new-firms-its-latest-cohort/ [https://perma.cc/HY6D-2EYJ]; Press 
Release, Abu Dhabi Global Market, Abu Dhabi Global Market Announces Launch of Digital Sandbox 
to Accelerate Financial Services Innovation and Financial Inclusion in the UAE and the Region (Sept. 
17, 2018), https://www.adgm.com/mediacentre/press-releases/adgm-announces-launch-of-digital-
sandbox-to-accelerate-financial-services-innovation-and-financial-inclusion-in-the-uae-and-the-region/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DB3-7M6C]. 
114. See Media Release, The Honourable Scott Morrison, Launch of an Innovative Regulatory 
Sandbox for Fintech (Dec. 15, 2016), http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/133-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/E3B5-3MKL]; AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, Fintech Regulatory Sandbox, (Jan. 5, 
2019), https://asic.gov.au/for-business/innovation-hub/fintech-regulatory-sandbox/ 
[https://perma.cc/U79X-PG9S] 
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Bahrain June 2017 Narrow115 Central Bank of 
Bahrain (CBB) 
Bermuda Proposed 
2018 
Narrow; but it exists 
within the framework 
of the “innovation 
hub” and encourages 
companies to use the 
it before eventually 
applying for entry 
into the Sandbox.116 
 
Bermuda 
Monetary 
Authority (BMA) 
Brazil Proposed 
June 2019 
Narrow117 Cooperation of 
Ministry of the 
Economy, Central 
Bank of Brazil, 
Securities 
Commission and 
Superintendent of 
Private Insurance 
 
Brunei Feb. 2017 Narrow118 The Fintech Office 
 
 
 
115.  See Rad El Treki, Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Launch Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech 
Firms, AL TAMIMI & CO. (Feb. 2018), https://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/central-bank-
bahrain-cbb-launch-regulatory-sandbox-fintech-firms-2/ [https://perma.cc/3K42-LMHW]. 
116. BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY, GUIDANCE NOTE—INSURANCE REGULATORY 
SANDBOX AND INNOVATION HUB (2018), https://www.bma.bm/viewPDF/documents/2019-03-28-07-
59-32-BMA-Insurance-Regulatory-Sandbox-Innovation-Hub-Guidance-Note.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2Q9F-DK73]. 
117. Press Release, Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, Comunicado Conjunto (June 13, 2019) 
(Braz.), http://www.cvm.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2019/20190613-1.html [https://perma.cc/3LWR-
YNWX]. 
118. See Press Release, Autoriti Monetari Brunei Darussalam, Fintech Regulatory Sandbox 
Guidelines (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.ambd.gov.bn/SiteAssets/fintech-office/FTSG%20v1_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BDE2-RNQY]. 
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Canada Feb. 2017 Narrow119 Canadian 
Securities 
Administrators  
Denmark Feb. 2018 Narrow; there is very 
limited regulatory 
relief. 120 
Danish Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority (the 
Finanstilsynet) 
 
Dubai May 2017 Narrow121 Dubai Financial 
Services Authority 
 
Fiji Proposed 
2017 
Broad; it is planned 
to provide a platform 
to enable existing 
financial institutions 
along with interested 
parties to individually 
lodge an application 
or collaborate to 
explore new products 
and services122 
 
Reserve Bank of 
Fiji 
 
 
119. CSA Regulatory Sandbox, CAN. SEC. ADM’RS, https://www.securities-
administrators.ca/industry_resources.aspx?id=1588 [https://perma.cc/TE3C-DJC6]; Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers, The Canadian Securities Administrators Launches a Regulatory Sandbox Initiative, 
CISION (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/the-canadian-securities-
administrators-launches-a-regulatory-sandbox-initiative-614619474.html [https://perma.cc/BF49-
HWZ6]. For more about the CSA’s authority to represent Canadian securities regulators, see Media 
Release, Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, ASIC Broadens Fintech Cooperation with Canadian Regulators 
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2017-releases/17-
430mr-asic-broadens-fintech-cooperation-with-canadian-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/9H2X-HJYN]. 
120. FT Lab, FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH., https://www.dfsa.dk/en/Supervision/Fintech/FT-lab 
[https://perma.cc/9QD4-5PPF]. 
121. See Innovation—The DFSA and Financial Technology, DUBAI FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (June 25, 
2019), https://www.dfsa.ae/Fintech [https://perma.cc/X8BG-N9PX]. 
122. RESERVE BANK OF FIJI, QUARTERLY REVIEW 45 (2017), 
https://www.rbf.gov.fj/getattachment/About-Bank/Organisational-Structure/Jan-2019.pdf?lang=en-US 
[https://perma.cc/VLR8-MC37]. 
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Hong Kong 
(Fintech 
Supervisory 
Sandbox) 
Sept. 2016 Narrow; but the 
Sandbox includes a 
chatroom to easily 
access consumer 
feedback, which may 
be considered broader 
than usual123 
 
Hong Kong 
Monetary 
Authority 
(HKMA) 
Hong Kong 
(Insurtech 
Sandbox ) 
Sept. 2017 Narrow124 Insurance 
Authority (IA) 
Hong Kong 
(SFC 
Regulatory 
Sandbox) 
Sept. 2017 Narrow125 
 
 
Securities and 
Futures 
Commission 
(SFC) 
 
Hungary Dec. 
2018126 
Narrow;127 but it sits 
within the framework 
of the “MNB 
InnoHub,”128 which is 
an innovation hub 
 
Central Bank of 
Hungary 
 
 
123. Fintech Supervisory Sandbox, (FSS), supra note 27. 
124. INS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2017-2018 54, 
https://www.ia.org.hk/en/infocenter/files/IA_Annual_Report_2017_18_English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EHK3-36KY]. 
125. SEC. AND FUTURES COMM’N, SFC REGULATORY SANDBOX (2017), 
https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/sfc-fintech-contact-point/sfc-regulatory-sandbox.html 
[https://perma.cc/69N4-LDAW]. 
126. Hungary: Central Bank Launches Regulatory Sandbox to Commence Operations from 2019, 
PAYMENTS COMPLIANCE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://paymentscompliance.com/premium-
content/research_report/hungary-central-bank-launches-regulatory-sandbox-commence-operations 
[https://perma.cc/E3RG-PFCB]. 
127. Regulatory Sandbox, MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK (MNB), https://www.mnb.hu/en/innovation-
hub/regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/9ANC-RECG].  
128. Services of the MNB InnoHub, MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK, 
https://www.mnb.hu/en/innovation-hub/#engedely [https://perma.cc/JC4J-K86L].  
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India Proposed 
2018 
Undetermined; the 
proposals (by both 
the Reserve Bank of 
India129 and the 
Insurance Regulatory 
and Development 
Authority of India130) 
are in the early stages 
 
Royal Bank of 
India and the 
Insurance 
Regulatory and 
Development 
Authority of India 
Indonesia Sept. 2018 Broad; aimed at 
facilitating 
communication 
between providers, 
monitoring 
development of 
businesses, and 
evaluating the 
offerings before they 
launch131 
 
Financial 
Technology office 
of the Bank of 
Indonesia 
Japan June 2018 Narrow132 Japan Economic 
Revitalization 
Bureau, the 
 
 
129. ET Bureau, RBI to Form Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech, Set Up Data Science Lab, ECON. 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/rbi-
to-form-regulatory-sandbox-for-fintech-set-up-data-science-lab/articleshow/65894188.cms 
[https://perma.cc/K5YF-AGW4]. 
130. PTI, Irdai to Develop “Sandbox” Approach for Fintech-Related Products, LIVEMINT (Sept. 
19, 2018), https://www.livemint.com/Industry/AjKydVlS6I68lH2Xq4mhDO/Irdai-to-develop-
sandbox-approach-for-fintechrelated-prod.html [https://perma.cc/5UKK-NJ9K]. 
131. IndonesiaGO Digital, Bank Indonesia’s Regulatory Sandbox of Fintech for the Assurance of 
the Consumer’s Safety, MEDIUM (Nov. 6, 2018), https://medium.com/@indonesiagodigital1/bank-
indonesias-regulatory-sandbox-of-fintech-for-the-assurance-of-the-consumer-s-safety-2497c07019e3 
[https://perma.cc/Y7LP-LK9F]. 
132. Opening of the Single Window of the Government of Japan for “Regulatory Sandbox 
Framework in Japan”, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/newsroom/2018/3f4f6be41d8f9201.html [https://perma.cc/9ZX5-
XY74]. 
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Government of 
Japan 
 
Jordan June 2018 Narrow133 Central Bank of 
Jordan 
 
Kazakhstan Jan. 2018 Broad; it also 
includes a fintech 
office134 
The Astana 
International 
Finance Centre 
(AIFC) as a part of 
the Astana 
Financial Services 
Authority135 
 
Kenya 
 
Proposed 
Dec. 2018 
Narrow136 Capital Markets 
Authority 
Kuwait Sept. 2018 Narrow137 Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK) 
 
Lithuania Sept. 2018 Narrow, but the Bank 
of Lithuania would 
Bank of Lithuania 
 
 
133. Media Release, Central Bank of Jordan, CBJ Unveils its Support to the Financial Technology 
(FinTech) Sector and Stresses on the Cryptocurrencies Ban, 
http://www.cbj.gov.jo/DetailsPage/CBJEN/NewsDetails.aspx?ID=214 [https://perma.cc/H2XE-3JUU]. 
134. ASTANA INT'L FIN. CTR. (AFSA), AIFC RULES NO. AFSA-F-PC-2019-0001,  AIFC 
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY RULES (FINTECH) 12 (2019), 
http://afsa.kz/storage/files/01708ab7f0da4b9c/FINTECH_v1_AFSA-F-PC-2019-0001_15.03.2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AN2V-8UAH]. 
135. Dene-Hern Chen, Kazakhstan Bets Big on a Fintech Future, OZY (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/kazakhstan-bets-big-on-a-fintech-future/85183/ 
[https://perma.cc/7LWG-PSRX]. 
136. CAPITAL MKTS. AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX POLICY GUIDANCE NOTE (2018), 
https://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=471:draft
-regulatory-sandbox-policy-guidance-note-2018&id=54:policy-guidance-notes&Itemid=202 
[https://perma.cc/6ZZZ-L43B]. 
137. CENT. BANK OF KUWAIT, REGULATORY SANDBOX FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (2019), 
https://www.cbk.gov.kw/en/legislation-and-regulation/regulatory-sandbox/general-framework.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/C64E-ST3V]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
BUCKLEY ET AL. ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
2020]                            Building Fintech Ecosystems                               91 
  
Jurisdiction Start Narrow or Broad? Authority 
“cooperate” with 
participants and 
“provide 
consultations within 
its competence”138 
 
Malaysia Oct. 2018 Narrow, but Bank 
Negara Malaysia acts 
as an “informal steer” 
(i.e., guiding and 
advising the applicant 
as an innovation hub 
would do) where 
sandbox provisions 
may not be applied 
because of existing 
regulations that 
appropriately target 
the firm and cannot 
be circumvented139 
 
Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
Malta Proposed 
Jan. 2019 
Broad; it is a wide, 
cross-sectorial 
approach with 
sandbox and fintech 
Innovation Hub as 
different “pillars” of 
a broader concept140 
Malta Financial 
Services Authority 
(MFSA) 
 
 
138. BANK OF LITH., RESOLUTION ON THE APPROVAL OF THE REGULATORY SANDBOX 
FRAMEWORK OF THE BANK OF LITHUANIA 1-2 (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.lb.lt/uploads/documents/files/EN/our-functions/supervision-of-financial-
institutions/sandbox/03-166_2018%2009%2019_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AJM-USH7]. 
139. BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA FRAMEWORK, supra note 19, at 1-2.  
140. MALTA FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MFSA FINTECH STRATEGY 12 (2019), 
https://www.mfsa.com.mt/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/MFSA-Fintech-Strategy-visual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G3TU-BVDN]. 
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Malta Jan. 2019 Narrow; only for 
Virtual Financial 
Assets and Virtual 
Tokens141 
 
Malta Gaming 
Authority (MGA) 
Mauritius Oct. 2016 Narrow; this 
“sandbox” is 
designed to allow 
business activity only 
when there “exists no 
legal framework, or 
adequate provisions” 
in the law to address 
the activity being 
proposed142 
 
Economic 
Development 
Board of 
Mauritius 
Mexico Mar. 2018 Broad; it is in the 
context of a whole 
fintech law,143 aiming 
at promoting 
financial innovation 
throughout the 
country144 
CNSF 
 
 
141. MALTA GAMING AUTH., GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF VIRTUAL FINANCIAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL TOKENS 
THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SANDBOX ENVIRONMENT (2018), https://www.mga.org.mt/wp-
content/uploads/MGA-VFA-and-ITA-Sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YFR-5KM2]. 
142. Regulatory Sandbox License, ECON. DEV. BD. MAURITIUS, 
http://www.edbmauritius.org/schemes/regulatory-sandbox-license/ [https://perma.cc/BF6E-LLSY]. 
143. Ley Para Regular Las Instituciones De Tecnología Financiera, DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA 
FÉDERACIÓN, (Sept. 3, 2018), 
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5515623&fecha=09/03/2018 
[https://perma.cc/L6UR-TWW3]. 
144. See DIEGO HERRERA & SONIA VADILLO, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 
IDB-DP-573, REGULATORY SANDBOXES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN FOR THE FINTECH 
ECOSYSTEM AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 16 (2018), 
https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Regulatory-Sandboxes-in-Latin-America-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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Mozambique May 2018 Narrow145 The Bank of 
Mozambique 
 
Netherlands Jan. 2017 Neither broad nor 
narrow; this sandbox 
only “leverages the 
scope offered by the 
law when interpreting 
the rules,” meaning 
that regulations are 
interpreted 
generously but are 
usually still applied146 
 
De Nederlandsche 
Bank 
Nigeria Mar. 2018 Narrow; but it is a 
part of the Financial 
Service Innovators 
Association of 
Nigeria147 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria and 
Nigerian Inter-
Bank Settlement 
System 
 
Norway Proposed 
Dec. 2018 
Narrow, but it is 
under the supervision 
of FSA, which also 
Finanstilsynet 
(Financial 
 
 
and-the-Caribbean-for-the-FinTech-Ecosystem-and-the-Financial-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW59-
6CVQ]. 
145. Agostinho, supra note 48; Mozambique: Incubator Extends Access to Financial Services, 
CLUB OF MOZAM. (May 18, 2018), https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-incubator-
extends-access-to-financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/WV8K-KFJT].  
146. DNB/AMF NEXT STEPS, supra note 19 at 2, 7 (“[S]upervisors may offer tailored 
arrangements where the law offers scope, if it provides for any dispensations from certain regulatory 
rules.”). 
147. Babajide Komolafe, CBN, NIBSS Unveil Regulatory Sandbox to Empower Fintechs, 
VANGUARD (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/cbn-nibss-unveil-regulatory-
sandbox-to-empower-fintechs/ [https://perma.cc/7W2Y-KA8P]; CENT. BANK OF NIGERIA, EXPOSURE 
DRAFT OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGY REFRESH (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2018/CCD/Exposure%20Draft%20of%20the%20National%20Financial
%20Inclusion%20Strategy%20Refresh_July%206%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4CS-FBWB]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
BUCKLEY ET AL. ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
94                               Journal of Law & Policy                                [Vol. 61 
 
 
Jurisdiction Start Narrow or Broad? Authority 
has an “innovation 
hub”148 
 
Supervisory 
Authority) 
Philippines Nov. 2017 Narrow149 Bangko Sentral ng 
Philinas (BSP)150 
Poland Oct. 2018 Narrow151 Polish Financial 
Supervision 
Authority 
 
Republic of 
Korea 
Apr. 2019 Narrow152 Financial Services 
Commission 
(FSC) 
 
Russia Apr. 2018 Narrow153 Central Bank of 
Russia 
 
Saudi Arabia Feb. 2019 Narrow;154 in 
conjunction with a 
broader 2030 plan to 
Saudi Arabian 
Monetary 
Authority 
 
 
148. Finansiell teknologi (FinTech), FINANSTILSYNET, (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.finanstilsynet.no/tema/fintech/ [https://perma.cc/BJ9A-8RTE]. 
149. Arai Garcia, The Philippines: The World’s Newest Tech Sandbox for The Third Web, 
CONSENSYS MEDIA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://media.consensys.net/the-philippines-the-worlds-newest-
tech-sandbox-for-the-third-web-c67759c653bc [https://perma.cc/6TP3-5T8A]. 
150. Je Gino-Gino, BSP Using the Regulatory Sandbox Approach for FinTech Companies in the 
Philippines, BITPINAS (Apr. 22, 2018), https://bitpinas.com/news/bsp-using-regulatory-sandbox-
approach-fintech-companies-philippines/ [https://perma.cc/7SM6-2QUE]. 
151. KOMISJA NADZORU FINANANSOWEGO (KNF), RULES GOVERNING THE “REGULATORY 
SANDBOX” AT THE POLISH FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AUTHORITY PROGRAM 1, 3-4, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190425182916/https:/www.knf.gov.pl/knf/en/komponenty/img/Rules_
Regulatory%20Sandbox_63545.pdf [https://perma.cc/82Y7-GSFK]. 
152. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm’n, Financial Innovation Support Act Passed in The National 
Assembly (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.fsc.go.kr/downManager?bbsid=BBS0048&no=131950 
[https://perma.cc/G4HE-EBP4]. 
153. Regulatory Platform, CENT. BANK OF RUSS., http://cbr.ru/fintech/regulatory_platform/ 
[https://perma.cc/QD99-2GAF]. 
154. About Us, SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AUTH., http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/Regulatory%20Sandbox/Pages/About-Us.aspx [https://perma.cc/U9FY-PVWB]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
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promote “financial 
inclusion”155 
 
Sierra Leona May 2018 Narrow156 Bank of Sierra 
Leone 
 
Singapore Sandbox: 
June 2016 
 
Sandbox 
express: 
Proposed 
Nov. 2018 
Sandbox: Narrow157 
 
Sandbox Express: 
Narrow; it is a 
particularly narrow 
but expediated 
sandbox designed for 
low risk ventures158 
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore 
South Africa Proposed 
Feb. 2018 
Broad; it is part of a 
proposed decision on 
“innovation 
facilitators,” defined 
as a collective term 
for innovation hubs, 
sandboxes and 
accelerators under the 
“SARB Financial 
Technology 
South African 
Reserve Bank 
(SARB) 
 
 
155. SAMA Launches Regulatory Sandbox For Financial Institution’s and Fintechs, SAUDI 
ARABIAN MONETARY AUTH. (Feb. 11, 2019), http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/News/Pages/news11022019.aspx [https://perma.cc/J7UX-C5BQ]. 
156. Requesting Applications to Participate in the BSL Sandbox Program, BANK OF SIERRA 
LEONE, https://www.bsl.gov.sl/BSL_Sandbox_Program.html (last visited June 25, 2019). 
157. See MAS GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 10.  
158. MAS Proposes Fintech Sandbox Scheme with Fast-track Approvals, STRAITS TIMES (Nov. 
14, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/business/banking/mas-proposes-fintech-sandbox-scheme-
with-fast-track-approvals [https://perma.cc/4MN5-Y6NV]. 
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(FinTech) 
programme”159 
 
Spain Proposed 
Feb. 2019 
Broad; it is part of a 
larger fintech law that 
contains additional 
measures such as a 
direct communication 
channel to the 
regulator and other 
authorities 
(“comunicaión ágil”) 
and a consultation 
mechanism to 
directly submit 
questions in case any 
doubts arise160 
 
Banco de España 
 
 
Sri Lanka Proposed 
May 2018 
Narrow161 Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka 
Switzerland Aug. 2017 Broad; it includes 
public funds of up to 
one million Swiss 
francs and is part of 
Swiss Federal 
Council 
 
 
159. Press Release, S. Afr. Government, Reserve Bank Establishes Financial Technology 
(FinTech) Programme (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.gov.za/speeches/fintech-13-feb-2018-0000 
[https://perma.cc/J78C-84DC]. 
160. Press Release, Ministerio de Economía y Empresa, El Gobierno Impulsa la Adaptación 
Delmarco de Regulación y Supervision Financiera al Nuevo Contexto Digital, con el Anteproyecto de 
Ley que Regula el Sandbox (Feb. 22, 2019), 
http://www.mineco.gob.es/stfls/mineco/prensa/ficheros/noticias/2018/190222_np_digital.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQ2W-ZHS7]. 
161. Press Release, Cent. Bank of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan FinTech Regulatory Sandbox (May 2, 
2018), 
https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/notices/notice_20180502_sri_lan
kan_fintech_regulatory_sandbox_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9N-XRFE]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
BUCKLEY ET AL. ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
2020]                            Building Fintech Ecosystems                               97 
  
Jurisdiction Start Narrow or Broad? Authority 
an “innovations 
area”162 
 
Taiwan Apr. 2018 Narrow; noting that 
protection from 
regulations is 
discretionary163 
 
Financial 
Supervisory 
Commission 
Thailand Dec. 2016 Narrow164 Bank of Thailand 
 
United 
Kingdom 
Dec. 2016 Narrow, but it sits 
within the broader 
framework of the 
Project Innovate 
 
Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 
United States Proposed 
July 2018 
(not yet 
launched) 
Narrow, but sits 
within the broader 
framework of the 
Office of 
Innovation165 
 
Consumer 
Financial 
Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) 
Arizona 07/2018 Narrow166 State Attorney 
General’s Office 
 
 
162. Press Release, The Fed. Council, Federal Council Wants to Reduce Barriers to Market Entry 
for Fintech Firms (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-
releases.msg-id-64356.html [https://perma.cc/Y92V-UE3P]. 
163. Regulatory Sandbox and Competition of Financial Technologies in Taiwan, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/regulatory-sandbox-and-
competition-of-financial-technologies-in-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/R4PY-KGF7]. 
164. Jason Corbet, Thailand Launches Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech Services, ASIA BUS. L.J. 
(June 19, 2017), https://www.vantageasia.com/thailand-launches-regulatory-sandbox-for-fintech-
services/ [https://perma.cc/Y4DC-8VU5]. 
165. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 84. 
166. Wendy Kearns & Andrew J. Lorentz, Fintech Sandboxes—Update on State Approaches, 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/payment-law-
advisor/2018/04/fintech-sandboxes--update-on-state-approaches [https://perma.cc/82CZ-3ALF]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
BUCKLEY ET AL. ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
98                               Journal of Law & Policy                                [Vol. 61 
 
 
Jurisdiction Start Narrow or Broad? Authority 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Proposed 
Jan. 2019 
(research-
ing 
effective 
imple-
mentation 
strategy) 
Undetermined, 
although the Mayor’s 
Order appears to have 
broad 
specifications167 
Innovation 
Council, reporting 
to the Mayor 
Wyoming Proposed 
02/2019 
Narrow168 Wyoming 
Division of 
Banking 
 
 
167. Press Release, Dep’t of Ins., Sec. & Banking, Mayor Establishes the District of Columbia 
Financial Services Regulatory Sandbox and Innovation Council (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://disb.dc.gov/release/mayor-establishes-district-columbia-financial-services-regulatory-sandbox-
and-innovation [https://perma.cc/Q2AW-9ST2]. 
168. H.B. 0057 65th Leg. (Wyo. 2019). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/10
